A study of twice failed select for promotion of lieutenants in the United States Navy and its cognitive impact on cost savings. by Nededog, Jose Terlaje
A STUDY OF TWICE FAILED SELECT FOR PROMOTION
OF LIEUTENANTS IN THE UNITED STATES








A Study of Twice Failed Select for Promotion of
Lieutenants in the United States Navy and its











SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
t. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
A Study of Twice Failed Select for Promotion of
Lieutenants in the United States Navy and
its Cognitive Impact on Cost Savings
5. TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
December 1975
4. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(»J
Jose Terlaje Nededog
• • CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
91
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME ft ADD * E %S(lt dl /lor.nl from Controlling Office)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93940




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of (hit Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abetract entered In Block 20, It dIUerent from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
1*. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverie elde II neceeeery end Identify by block number)
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reveree elde If neceeeary and Identity by block number)
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold:
1. It seeks to investigate the current statutes, regulations, instructions,
and policies regarding the involuntary separation of officers resulting
from failure to be selected for promotion to lieutenant commander.
2. It attempts to estimate a lower limit of real costs associated with
each officer separation of this type.
DD I JAN*73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 IS OBSOLETE
(Page 1) S/N 0102-014-6601 I
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED
$LCUH1 T Y CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PtOEf^tn Drtm Enlmfd-
Abstract #20 (cont'd)
It is the author's hope that conclusions drawn from the data presented
can be used by the Navy to more accurately evaluate whether it is more
beneficial to the Navy to separate twice failed select officers or to
retain them on active duty.
DD Form 1473
1 Jan 73 UNCLASSIFIED
S/N 0102-014-6601 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACEfWh.n Dmf Enft.d)

A Study of Twice Failed Select for Promotion of Lieutenants
in the United States Navy and its Cognitive Impact on Cost Savings
By
?. NededJose IV og
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A. , University of Maryland, 1972
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of









The purpose of this thesis is two-fold:
1. It seeks to investigate the current statutes, regulations/
instructions, and policies regarding the involuntary separation of
officers resulting from failure to be selected for promotion to
lieutenant corrmander.
2. It attempts to estimate a lower limit of real costs
associated with each officer separation of this type.
It is the author's hope that conclusions drawn from the data
presented can be used by the Navy to more accurately evaluate
whether it is more beneficial to the Navy to separate twice failed
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I. INTR3DUCTI0N
Every year, the Navy separates a certain number of naval officers
as a result of their not being selected for promotion to the rank
of lieutenant commander. As a matter of fact, the Navy in the past
five years has separated an average of 191 lieutenants each year. From
this administrative action a question arises. Is it more cost effective
to separate Navy lieutenants who have twice failed to be selected for
promotion than to retain them on active duty? This question is particularly
significant during a period when the Navy is having junior officer
retention problems. This retention problems is clearly expressed in
1 2
the Officer Personnel Newsletters for December, 1973 / October, 1974
3
and Spring 1975 / published by the Chief of Naval Personnel.
A. BACKGROUND
The increased awareness of defense spending has forced the military
to be more acutely aware of an axiom which has always been true, even
during wartime, but has been ignored largely because it involves so
much honest and painful self-analysis. The basic fact is this: Military
decisions must be thought of as essentially economic decisions in which
maximization of our defense posture depends upon the effective
utilization of the nation's resources which have been allocated in the
form of tax dollars. And, as citizens become more critical of the
Bureau of Naval Personnel, The Officer Personnel Newsletter
,
Washington, D. C. , December, 1973, p. 3.
2 Bureau of Naval Personnel, The Officer Personnel Newsletter
,
Washington, D. C, October, 1974, p. 3.
Bureau of Naval Personnel, The Officer Personnel Newsletter
,
Washington, D. C, Spring 1975, p. 2.
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large allocation of resources to this end, the need for economically
efficient decisions by the military becomes more pronounced.
As a result of this new, or more accurately, increased need
for the application of economic criteria to military decisions making,
many studies have been written dealing specifically with this problem.
Hitch and McKean in their book, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age
,
present this new way of looking at military problems.
This is illustrated by the following statements:
"Essentially we regard all military problems as,
in one of their aspects, economic problems in the
efficient allocation and use of resources. We
believe that this way of looking at military
problems goes far toward reconciling the apparent
conflict of view between the officers and officials
who are responsible for defense and the officials
and Congressmen whose primary interest is
economy. . .except in determining the overall size
of the military budget, where conflict between
these points of view is inevitable."
Many other studies, both within the Defense Department and by
civilian research groups function to aid the military in assuming this
new peacetime role of efficiency expert.
Indeed one of the many tasks facing the Navy is that of analyzing
its various costs in terms of its overall objective categories.
This is nothing more than cost effectiveness at all levels of spending
extending from the President's budget down to the smallest procurement
or investment made by the Department of the Navy.
4 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economic of Defense




To the author's knowledge, none of the cost studies conducted to
date, have attempted to measure the cost associated with the separation
of twice failed select Navy lieutenants. The absence of any cost
analysis in this area is due largely to the fact that this aspect of
personnel management is governed by either federal laws or long standing
policies. It, therefore, seems appropriate that some effort be made
to collect and assimilate data concerning this particular category of
officers, and then to transpose this data into a meaningful estimate
of actual dollar costs.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are:
1. To study the current statutes, instructions, regulations,
and policies regarding the separation of Navy lieutenants resulting
from failure to be selected for promotion to lieutenant commander.
2. To estimate a lower limit of "real" costs which are
associated with each officer separation.
Conclusions drawn from the data gathered will be presented along
with derived costs estimates and possible alternatives. It is hoped
that it will answer the question: Is it more cost effective to separate
Navy lieutenants who have twice failed selection to lieutenant commander




A. OBTAINING OF DATA
In the course of obtaining the data necessary for this thesis,
several approaches were followed :
1. A study of the relevant statutes, regulations, instructions,
and policies were examined.
2. A cost analysis study was made using data from the various
cost literatures published by the department of the Navy and from direct
information from various offices within the Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Washington, D. C. and Navy Education and Training Command, Pensacola,
Florida.
3. A questionnaire was mailed to Navy lieutenants who had
twice failed selection to lieutenant commander, and were separated
not later than June 30, 1975. The questions comprising the
questionnaire were based on:
a. Discussion with several active duty officers concerning
what items should be considered in order to be able to form some
conclusions as to the character and training of the officers
involuntarily separated,
b. The writer's personal experience in the Bureau of Naval
Personnel responsible for interpreting and executing policies
affecting involuntary separation of Naval officers.
A covering letter was mailed with the questionnaire. It explained
the purposes of the study and requested the cooperation of those to
whom it was addressed. A copy of this letter and of the questionnaire
used are contained in Appendices A and B.
13

B. ANALYSIS OF DATA
The analysis of data gathered from the questionnaire with derived
cost estimates is presented in Chapter IV. Conclusions drawn from




There are many limitations inherent in any study involving
personnel costs. The most obvious caution to be exerted in such a
study is to insure that costs and quantities do not become synonymous
with performance and quality. In the field of personnel this is
an especially dangerous comparison to make, or even to suggest. It
is not difficult to quantify the number of officers the Navy is required
to separate each year. It is also not difficult to quantify the
number of officers the Navy must procure. However, the problem of
quantifying the quality of the individual officer becomes very complex
and dependent upon many subjective factors that have never been
quantified.
Additionally, a number of general assumptions must be made. These
general assumptions should be kept in mind throughout the study:
1. A discount rate which is generally 10% in the military has
not been employed.
2. Future pay increases are ignored. While future pay increases
can reasonably be expected, it has been ignored due to the fluctuating
and uncertain magnitude of any such increases.
3. Reserve officers are not included in the study. Although
Reserve officers are subject to involuntary release to inactive
duty resulting from failure of selection for promotion two or more
times, this study was limited only to Regular Navy lieutenants. Reserve
lieutenants were eliminated from the study because they are subject
15

to separate provisions of the law.
Reserve lieutenants who fail selection for promotion two or more
times by the active duty promotion selection board, are released to
inactive duty by policy only. Reserve officers released to inactive
duty, retain their reserve commission and may continue to affiliate
with the Navy through the various Reserve programs. In case of
national emergency they are recalled to active duty and their services
again are fully utilized. On the other hand, the involuntary separation
of Regular Navy lieutenants is required by statutory provisions. Once
separated, they no longer have any connection with the Navy unless they





A. FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF QUESTIONNAIRE
On December 19, 1974, the Navy reported a total of 273 Regular
Navy lieutenants who failed selection for promotion the second time,
and two women officers who have completed 13 years commission service
5
who were not on the promotion list. This is a total of 275 Navy
lieutenants which represents approximately 19 percent of total eligible
for promotion.
These officers were all informed of their status early in 1975
and were all scheduled for separation on or prior to June 30, 1975.
The author's original intention was to mail the questionnaire to
all 275 lieutenants listed on the report. However, only 260 questionnaires
were mailed. The reason for this is as follows:
1. One officer was medically discharged.
2. Ten officers were within two years of becoming eligible to
retire with pay. The Navy's current policy is to retain this category
of officers by offering them reserve appointment for the purpose of
continuing them on active duty until retirement eligibility is attained.
These officers were offered and have accepted the Reserve appointments.
3. Four officers were not included on the mailing list because of
unanticipated difficulty encountered in getting correct addresses.
B. TABULATION
In compiling the individual questionnaire returns, the results of
a number of questions were carefully tabulated by officer designators.
5 ....Bureau of Naval Personnel, Director , Promotions and Retirement Division ,
Memorandum, Pers-481-bl, December, 1974.
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This method of tabulation was done in order to clarify the number of
officers in each group who responded to the questionnaire. Definition
of the designator is in accordance with the Navy Register . In tables
and charts in which these groups are used, they will be referred to
by the identifying designator defined as follows:
DESIGNATOR DEFINITION
1100 A line officer unrestricted in the performance
of duty.
1110 A line officer unrestricted in the performance
of duty who is qualified in surface warfare.
1120 A line officer unrestricted in the performance of
duty who is qualified in submarine warfare.
1160 A line officer unrestricted in the performance of
duty who is in training for surface warfare.
1310 A line officer unrestricted in the performance of
duty who is qualified for duty involving flying
heavier-than-air, or heavier and lighter-than-air
type aircraft as a pilot.
1320 A line officer unrestricted in the performance of
duty who is a member of the aeronautical
organization who is a flight officer.
1350 A line officer unrestricted in the performance of
duty who is a menber of the aeronautical
organization who is not a pilot or a flight officer,
° Bureau of Naval Personnel , Register of Commission and Warrant Officers
of the Unitea States Navy ana Reserve Officers on Active Duty , NAVFEES





1410 A line officer restricted in the performance of
duty who is an Engineering Duty Officer (Ship
Engineering)
.
1510 A line officer restricted in the performance of
duty who is an Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officer
(Aeronautical Engineering)
.
1520 A line officer restricted in the performance of
duty who is an Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officer
(Aviation Maintenance)
.
1610 A line officer restricted in the performance of
duty who is a Special Duty Officer (Cryptology)
.
1630 A line officer restricted in the performance of
duty who is a Special Duty Officer (Intelligence)
.
2100 A staff corps officer who is a member of the Medical
Corps.
3100 A staff corps officer who is a member of the Supply
Corps.
5100 A staff corps officer who is a member of the Civil
Engineer Corps.
Tabulation of the 260 questionnaires mailed showed seven or 2.7 percent
were returned by the Post Office Department marked unclaimed. Of the
remaining 253 questionnaires, 160 or 63.2 percent were completed and
returned. A total of 93 or 36.7 percent did not respond. Table I
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The questionnaire, Appendix B, was divided into six major
areas of coverage to help in analyzing relevant information.
FIRST AREA . (Questions 1-17) . These are general information
questions to determine the status of the officer and the Navy's possible
investment in that officer.
SECOND AREA . (Questions 18-23) . These questions were asked in
order to obtain some information regarding the performance of the
individual officer and to ascertain scare possible reasons for his failure
to be selected for promotion. Through this line of questioning
the writer hoped to determine whether the officer was a satisfactory
performer and should have been considered for further continuation on
active duty as a Reserve officer or enlisted man.
Obviously, some degree of bias was expected since an officer may
be reluctant to admit that he had performed less than satisfactorily.
However, it was felt that responses to these questions and the
questions from other areas of the questionnaire would provide relevant
data which could be analyzed to determine to a certain degree the
officer's performance.
THIRD AREA . (Question 24). This question was asked in order
to determine whether the officer intended to make the Navy a
career.
FOURTH AREA . (Questions 25-27) . The questions asked were to
determine if the officer under the circumstances would be willing to
21

accept feasible alternatives for the purpose of continuing on active
duty* 1^° possible alternatives were presented to the officer:
1. Acceptance of a Reserve appointment and continue on active
duty, or
2. Enlistment for purpose of continuing on active duty as an
enlisted man.
FIFTH AREA . (Questions 28-32) . These were general questions
relevant to the officer's separation cost. Answers to these questions
provided information regarding how much it would cost to separate a
twice failed select Navy lieutenant under current statutory provisions,
Specifically, Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 6382 states that
Regular officers involuntarily separated for failure of selection for
promotion are entitled by law for a lump-sum payment as follows:
"Each officer discharged under this section is
entitled to a lump-sum payment equal to two months'
basic pay at the time of discharge multiplied by
the number of years of total commissioned service
as computed under section 6387 of this title but
the payment may not be more than two years' basic
pay. .. .However, no person is entitled to a lump-sum 7
payment under this section that is more than $15,000."
In addition to severance pay as required by statutory provisions,
other costs are also incurred. These costs are:
1. Lump-sum payment of leave, and
2. Travel pay.
Responses to questions 28-32 provide information whereby cost
estimates can be made for leave and travel pay.
7 United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces , U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C, 1971, Vol. 2, p. 1824.
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SIXTH AREA . (Question 33) . This question was asked to determine
respondees 1 feelings regarding the Navy's management policies of
Navy lieutenants who have failed to be selected for lieutenant
commander.
DISCUSSION, FIRST AREA, GENERAL INFORMATION
Questions 1 through 5 were included primarily as a check on the
accuracy of the category of officers under study and to determine the
source of corLiuissioning. These questions served two general purposes:
1. To determine whether the officer was originally a Reserve
officer who had gone through a rigorous augmentation selection board
to be a regular officer, and
2. To determine some estimates of the officer's pre-commissioning
learning cost.
Table II shows that of the total responses, 40 were former USNR
officers who received their regular commission through the augmentation
board. Information received from the Bureau of Naval Personnel and
the augmentation article from the Officer Personnel Newsletter indicates
that selection of a Reserve officer for augmentation into the regular
Navy depends on:
a. Outstanding performance.
b. Outstanding fitness reports.
c. Experience.
d. Outstanding educational background and has potential
for completing a technical graduate education.




LISTING BY DESIGNATOR TWICE FAILED
SELECT LIEUTENANTS WHO HAVE
PREVIOUS USNR APPOINTMENTS
NUMBER IN NUMBER WITH PREVIOUS PERCENT IN
DESIGNATOR CATEGORY USNR DESIGNATOR CATEGORY
1110 38 6 15.78
1120 9 1 11.11
1160 1 1 100
1310 49 10 20.40





1610 4 1 25
1630 3 2 66.67
3100 15 3 20
5100 2 1 50
TOTAL 160 40 25^
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Past selections have indicated that only those "Head and
Shoulders" type Reserve officers were selected for augmentation. Thus,
it can be assumed that up to the point of selection for regular
appointment, this group of officers are highly competitive.
Tabulation of responses to question 5 show the following source
of commissioning or programs and the number of officers who were
commissioned under each of the programs:
PROGRAM NUMBER
Naval Academy 37
Officer Candidate School (CCS) 23
Naval Aviation Candidate (NAVCAD) 30
Aviation Officer Candidate (ADC) 11
Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate (AVROC) 1
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) (Regular) 29
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) (Contract) 6
Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP) 23
TOTAL 160
Table II shows the designation of the officers at the time they
were notified of their scheduled involuntary separation. As can be readily
seen, the aviation community makes up the majority of categories of
officers who failed to be selected for promotion. Major reason that can
be accounted for this is the fact that the aviation community comprised
one of the largest communities in the Navy. The fact also remains that
training aviators in the Navy is very costly as will be observed in
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Questions 6 through 9 were intended to determine service school attended
including colleges and or universities of which the Navy provided the costs.
Based on responses received, it shows that there were 355 different service
school courses attended and completed by one or more officers. These courses
do not include courses attended as enlisted men by those officers with
previous enlisted service. Duration of the courses range from a one week
"Firefighting" course to a 20 month "Flight Training" course. Technical
skills learned range from computer programming to highly sophisticated
nuclear weapons.
Table IV shows the college or university attended by the officers
who responded to the questionnaire. Only those schools where cost is
paid by the Navy are shown.
Specifically, question 9 was intended for responses only where the
officer took his postgraduate school under a Navy sponsored program. However,
it appears that the question was not totally clear because many officers
responded to having taken postgraduate studies not necessarily sponsored by
the Navy. Responses in this area seems to indicate that some have taken
postgraduate education on a part time basis. In view of the possible
misinterpretation of the question, only those officers who have indicated
that they have taken postgraduate work at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California are tabulated. It should be realized that this is a
low number. A great majority of the officers have achieved the graduate
level degrees through off duty studies, using their own funds, tuition aids
or in-service veterans educational assistance. However, since it is not
clear as to which of these costs could be applied as a Navy's investment
cost in the officer, no attempt was made to tabulate them. Thus, any
postgraduate costs inferred in this thesis is to be interpreted as meaning
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As can be readily seen on Table IV, the 160 officers who
completed the questionnaire 108 or 67.5 percent have received their
undergraduate education at either a civilian institution or military
school at which the Navy paid the cost. Further, it is noteworthy that of
those group of officers shown on Table IV NESEP and Naval Academy ranks
as top in number. According to the figures in the Officer Personnel Cost,
WOS 71-4 and direct information received from the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, these two groups are very expensive source of officer procurement.
1. NESEP - NESEP students are selected from top enlisted and are
sent to a four year college at the Navy's expense. These students
retained their military status receiving full pay and allowances while
undergoing a four year undergraduate program. The average NESEP enlisted
pay grade is E-6 and married.
2. MIDSHIPMEN - Midshipmen are selected to the Naval Academy on
a very competitive basis. These officers prior to their commissioning
receive monthly allowances plus all costs necessary on their four years
at the Naval Academy.
Table V is a tabulation of postgraduate school attended. Of
the 160 who responded to the questionnaire 28, or 17.5 percent indicated
that they had postgraduate education from the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California.
The results from questions 10, 11 and 12 showing the marital and
dependency status of the officers responding to the questionnaire are
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of these officers were married at the time they were notified of having
twice failed select for promotion, as compared to 8.75 percent who were
single without dependents. The remaining 2.50 percent were divided
between those who were previously married or not married but have
dependents. Questions 11 and 12 specifically asked for dependents
12 years and older and dependents with less than 12 years old. This
distinction was originally intended in order to determine travel cost
of dependents. These questions, however, are no longer valid since
age for travel purposes is no longer a factor with respect to travel
allowances. Thus, dependency are tabulated without consideration of
age.
TABLE VT
MARITAL AND DEPENDENCY STATUS OF OFFICERS
PERCENT OF TOTAL
STATUS NUMBER RESPONSES
Married with dependents 142 88.75
Single without dependents 14 8.75
Previously married and
single with dependents 4 2.50
Responses to questions 13 through 17 indicate that the active duty of
the officers, including enlisted service, range from 8 years to 17 years
and 11 months. Average number of moves of which the officer received
travel pay and movement of household is 5.131. Basic pay range from
31

$1,140.00 to $1,384.20 as a result of increment increases depending
on length of service. Special pay which is in addition to basic pay,
BAS and BAQ range from $185.00 to $265.00. Special pay is normally
given for reason of hazardous duty or special duty such as Flight pay,
Submarine pay, etc. Special compensation given as incentive to continue
on active duty are also given to a limited number of officers with
special skill and qualifications. Total special compensation received
among those officers who responded is $84,100.00.
DISCUSSION, SECOND AREA, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
While it is impossible to get information regarding the reasons
why an officer failed selection for promotion, questions 18 through 23
of the questionnaire attempts to obtain some information as to whether
the officer was aware of his assignments and whether or not he feels that
his assignments may have some relevancy to his failure of selection.
Additionally, these questions attempts to establish whether the officer
made any attempt to improve his career pattern and chances for promotion
by contacting the Bureau of Naval Personnel specifically his detailer.
Responses to questions 18, 19 and 20 are provided as follows:
Question 18: Were you aware when you first failed of selection
for promotion?
YES 136 85% of total responding
NO 24 15% of total responding
32

Question 19: Do you feel that the reason for your non-selection
for promotion was because of the lack of career enhancing billet
which you were assigned to?
YES 81 51% of total responding
NO 79 49% of total responding
Question 20: When you knew that you failed of selection for
promotion the first time, did you try to reach your detailer to discuss
reassignment to a billet that may be more career enhancing?
YES 61 38% of total responding
NO 99 62% of total responding
While the foregoing questions do not disclose how many of the
officers have contacted their detailer for assistance/ it is nevertheless
felt that some significance must be attached to the fact that contribution
of their non-selection is partially in the Navy's management in their
career patterns.
Responses to questions 21 , 22 and 23 are as follows:
Question 21: During the time that you held a commission in the
Navy or Naval Reserve, did you receive any (one or more) unsatisfactory
or unfavorable fitness reports?
YES 4 2.5% of total responding
NO 156 97.5% of total responding
Question 22: If your answer to question 21 above is YES, do you
feel that this fitness report (s) was (were) unjustified (please mark
only one answer)?
DEFINITELY UNJUSTIFIED 1 .7% of total responding




Question 23: What effect did this (these) report (s) have in
your failure of selection for promotion?
TREMENDOUS EFFECT
GREAT EFFECT
LITTLE EFFECT 4 2.5% of total responding
Of the total responding to the questionnaire, only 4 or 2.5%
have indicated that they have unsatisfactory or unfavorable fitness
report during the period they held their conmissions in the Navy.
However, they all feel that the specific unsatisfactory or unfavorable
reports have little effect in their non-selection for promotion.
DISCUSSION, THIRD AREA, CAREER INTENTION
Question 24, although considered superferlous for this group of
officers, it was considered relevant since records in the Bureau of
Naval Personnel have revealed that some officers have resigned their
commissions even after completion of approximately 11^ years of service.
Thus, this question was intended to determine if any among the twice
failed select Navy lieutenants had not really intended to make the
Navy a career. For those who did not intend to make the Navy a
career, the assumption would be that it makes no difference whether
this officer failed select or not, the loss of the Navy's investment
in that officer cannot be prevented. It is noteworthy, however, that
responses received regarding this particular question show that of the
160 who completed the questionnaire, all or 100% have indicated that the
Navy is definitely their career.
34

DISCUSSION, FOURTH AREA, WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE UNDER AN ALTERNATIVE
ACTION
Questions 25, 26 and 27 were asked in the light that such action
are feasible without legislative inactment. Under current policies,
a twice failed select officer who is within two years of becoming
eligible to retire with pay is given the opportunity to resign his
regular corrmission and accept a Reserve appointment in order to
continue on active duty as a Reserve officer solely for the purpose of
attaining retirement eligibility.
This same policy can be applied to a twice failed select officer
who is not within two years of becoming eligible to retire with pay,
but have shown potential or possess skills that would be of definite
asset to the Navy.
In response to questions 25, 26 and 27, the following are provided:
Question 25: If the Navy offers you an appointment in the Naval
Reserve after you are discharged for the purpose of continuing on
active duty, would you accept the appointment?
YES 118 76% of total responding
NO 37 24% of total responding
Five were undecided and were not included in the tabulation.
8 Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Development and Distribution
Manual, November 23, 1974, Chapter VII, Section 7104(h), p. VII-4.
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Question 26: If you cannot be appointed in the Naval Reserve,
but the Chief of Naval Personnel offered you the opportunity to enlist
after discharge in order to serve on active duty in an enlisted status
would you enlist?
YES 36 23% of total responding
NO 121 77% of totabl responding
Three were undecided and were not included in the tabulation.
Question 27: If your answer to 26 above is YES what would be
the lowest enlisted pay grade you will be willing to enlist in?
E-3 00 00% of total YES responses
E-4 00 00% of total YES responses
E-5 02 06% of total YES responses
E-6 02 06% of total YES responses
E-7 10 28% of total YES responses
E-8 04 10% of total YES responses
E-9 18 50% of total YES responses
From the foregoing statistics, it can be seen that of the 160 responses
to the questionnaire, 118 or 73.75% are willing to become USNR officers
for the purpose of continuing on active duty. However, only 36 or
23% of total responding are willing to enlist and continue on active
duty as enlisted men. It is also evident that although several were
desirous of continuing on active duty as enlisted men, only 4 or 10 percent
of the total desiring to enlist were willing to enlist in pay grades lower




DISCUSSION, FIFTH AREA, GENERAL COST INFORMATION
Questions 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 were asked in order to accumulate
data regarding separation cost. Responses to question 28 indicate that
the average number of days leave at date of separation is 55.13.
Since, the officer has the right to receive a lump-sum payment for accrued
leave not used at date of separation, this amount is definitely a
separation cost for the Navy. Responses to question 29 show that 90 or
56.3% were filling billets which required contact relief. This mean
that before the lieutenant is separated, he must be replaced by another
officer. The Navy must pay for the replacement cost.
Responses to question 30 indicate that 103 were serving on board
ship, squadron or overseas station. Responses to questions 31 and 32
show that 115 will make a home of selection for travel purposes. Of
this number, 67 have indicated that the home of selection is farther
away than the home of record. This indicated a greater travel expense
which will be borne by the Navy. A close approximation of these costs,
however, is not available to the writer. Accordingly, the cost analysis
for this part of the separation cost is based on the average "Permanent
Change of Station" cost per move provided by the Bureau of Naval
Personnel
.
DISCUSSION, SIXTH AREA, GENERAL COMMENTS ON NAVY MANAGEMENT POLICIES
REGARDING TWICE FATLFT) SELECT OFFICERS
On question 33, individual comments and/or recommendations were
solicited regarding the Navy's policy and/or management of twice failed
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select officers. Coirments and recommendations including the frequency
of the Garments are indicated in Appendix C. It should be noted that
while a few of the coirments were bitter and specifically pointed at
particular individuals or organization in the Navy, the majority
indicated a sincere interest in the question as a whole and a desire for
pointing out possible areas the respondees see as problems in this group
of officers. Thus, only those comments considered relevant to the
question were tabulated and provided in Appendix C. The relevant comments
are not verbatim of the individual officer, but rather a summation of
the general subject from which the specific comments were made.
D. iOWESTMENT OOST ANALYSIS
To fully understand the cost analysis of the involuntary separation
of Regular Navy lieutenants, it is necessary to understand the investment
attributed to an officer with respect to the various cost factors involved
in procurement, training, and separation. The cost analysis model
indicated in Figure 1 will be used for the purpose of determining




The costs provided are present value cost estimates and includes
direct and indirect costs. Per capita estimates versus actual costs
were used since actual costs involve many cost factors peculiar to each
individual. Thus, to obtain actual costs regarding each individual officer
would (in addition to requiring extensive research beyond the scope




MODEL FOR MEASURING THE COST IN A NAVY LIEUTENANT



































1. Acquisition Cost .
Acquisition cost includes all of the direct costs of recruiting
such as recruiter's pay, selecting, and transporting recruits, etc.,
as well as certain indirect costs such as facilities costs, clerical
pay, advertising, etc. The funds expended on potential officers prior
to their conmissioning are spent with the expectation that the candidates
will be corrmissioned and become productive naval officers.
The average acquisition cost for each officer varies by the type
of program he was originally recruited for. Cost data used for the
acquisition cost in this analysis is based on the average cost presented
9in the Officer Personnel Costs, WOS-71-4. The cost data are aligned
with the relevant source of commissioning of the 160 respondees of
the questionnaire. Table VTI shows the relevant average acquisition
cost for each of the programs indicated.
° Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory, Officer Personnel
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2. Learning Cost .
In addition to the acquisition costs that must be incurred,
learning cost must also be incurred. Learning cost are operationally
defined as the cost incurred while an individual achieves the level of
productivity that is normally expected in a given position. Thus,
when an officer candidate has been selected, additional investments
are made prior to sending him to his first assignment. Such investment
are classified into two categories:
a. Pre-commissioning costs
b. Post-commissioning costs
(1) Pre-commissioning costs . These costs include formal
education and training. Various programs and institutions such as the
Naval Academy at Annapolis, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC)
,
at various colleges and universities throughout the country, and the
Officer Candidate School (CCS) at Orlando, Florida are maintained
to provide the needed training and education.
The average pre-commissioning costs under the eight different
programs indicated in this study are shown on Table VTII.
(2) Post-commissioning costs . After an officer has been
successfully commissioned, the Navy continues to make investment in
him through further training and education. These are categorized as
post-coinmissioning costs, (i.e. classified Fleet Schools, Staff Corps
Schools, Flight Schools, Postgraduate Education, Technical Schools)
.




















































































































buildings must be purchased and maintained. Even when private
educational institutions are used for Fleet Schools, tuition and book
allowances are involved.
Table IX contains examples of the various school course costs
which may be applied to the per capita worth of the officer. The
costs are derived from the latest available per capita cost of
training that can be obtained by this writer. These courses are just
a sample of the 355 courses attended by one or more of the respondees
to the questionnaire.
The Navy also finances postgraduate work for many of its officers.
According to the latest figures that can be obtained, the average
estimated cost for postgraduate education is $7,108.00.10 This average
figure does not include pay and allowances of the officer.
It must also be realized that even after an officer reports to
his new duty station, much of the initial time is spent gaining
experience and knowledge. Thus, since the officer during such a phase-in
period is learning rather than performing, the phase-in period should
be considered as cost which can be related to training cost, however,
no dollar value can be easily calculated.
3. Separation Costs . Separation costs are the costs of
separating an officer either voluntarily or involuntarily. When an officer
is separated voluntarily such as resignation after the end of his obligated
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service, the only direct cost involved in his separation is his travel
and pay and allowances due him. On the other hand, involuntary separations
are costly. Regular officers involuntarily separated for failure of
selection for promotion are entitled by law for a lump-sum payment of
two months basic pay times the number of years of commissioned service
or a maximum of $15,000, whichever is the lesser amount. -^
Table X shows the average cost for the involuntary separation of




AVERAGE AVERAGE BASIC MAX SEP. PAY MAX AMOUNT LEAVE & TOTAL
ACTIVE SERV. MONTHLY PAY AT BASED ON TITLE OF SEP. PAY TRAVEL SEPARATION
IN YEARS TIME OF SEP. 10, U.S. CODE ENTITLEMENT PAY PAY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
11.5 $1,266 $29,118 $15,000 $4,326 $19,326
Column explanation:
(1) Average active service computed based on total service divided by the
number of USN lieutenants responding to the questionnaire.
(2) Average basic monthly pay computed based on total pay divided by the
number of USN lieutenants responding to the questionnaire
(3) Maximum amount of separation pay based on two months basic pay
times the average number of years of active service.
(4) Maximum amount that can be received in accordance with 10 USC 6382
and 10 USC 6387.
(5) Leave and Travel computed based on the average of 55.13 days leave
plus average PCS move. PCS cost is based on operational moves of the
officer concerned.
(6) Total separation pay that can be received.
United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces , United States Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1971, Vol., 2, pp. 1824 and 1828.
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The accumulated total cost that can be attributed to an officer
under the eight major programs used for the purpose of this analysis
can be found by the formula:
TCS = pc + ppc + PC + SLT
Where: TCS = Total investment cost for the first 11.5 average
years of service.
AC = Acquisition cost for a given program.
PRC = Pre-commissioning cost.
PC = Post-commissioning cost.
SLT = Separation, Leave and Travel cost.
Cost figures are indicated on Table XI.
It is emphasized that costs provided on Table XI are estimates
which include direct and indirect costs that can be obtained.
Nevertheless, the estimated costs provided, represent an overall
view of the amount of investment in an officer at the time he is
separated. Also, it should be noted that, although Table XI indicates only
eight programs, it does not mean to imply that these are the only
programs in the Navy. There are obviously other programs. However,
these eight programs provide the necessary cross sectional comparison
of the officers being involuntarily separated and a cross section




COMPARISON OF TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS UNDER
EIGHT DIFFERENT PROGRAMS
ACQUISIT]:on COMMISSIONI COMMISSION leave/travel total
PROGRAM COST COST COST COST COST
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NO NUCLEAR TRAINING
Naval Academy $ 35 $48,674 $135,964 $19,326 $203,999
NROTC-Regular 50 12,244 123,988 19,326 155,608
NROTC-Contract 50 5,437 111,710 19,326 136,523
OCS 1,397 2,868 112,762 19,326 136,353
NESEP 35 43,280 112,762 19,326 175,403
WITH SURFACE NUCLEAR TRAINING
Naval Academy 35 48,674 142,606 19,326 210,641
NROTC-Regular 50 12,244 142,906 19,326 174,526
NROTC-Contract 50 5,437 130,630 19,326 155,443
OCS 1,397 2,822 131,684 19,326 155,229
NESEP 35 43,280 131,684 19,326 194,325
WITH SUBMARINE TRAINING (CONVENTIONAL)
Naval Academy 35 48,674 158,010 19,326 226,045
NROTC-Regular 50 12,244 144,058 19,326 175,678
NROTC-Congract 50 5,437 136,968 19,326 161,781
OCS 1,397 2,822 138,162 19,326 161,707



























WITH SUBMARINE NUCLE INING
Naval Academy $ 35 $ 48,,674 $163,,361 $19
,
,326 $231,,396
NROTC--Regular 50 12,,244 163,,661 19,,326 195,,281
NROTC-Contract 50 5,,437 149,,405 19,,326 174,,218
ocs 1,397 2,,822 150,,645 19,,326 174,,190
NESEP 35 43, 280 150,,645 19,,326 213,,286
WITH PILOT TRAINING
Naval Academy 35 48, 674 467,,694 19,,326 535, 729
NROTC--Regular 50 12, 244 504,,539 19,,326 536, 159
NROTC-Contract 50 5, 437 467,,994 19,,326 492, 807
OCS 1,397 2, 822 469,,200 19,,326 492, 745
NAVCAD 1,397 108, 228 364,,388 19,,326 493, 339
AVROC 1,397 2, 868 475,,686 19,,326 499,,277
AOC 1,397 5, 200 463,,448 19,,326 489, 371
NESEP 35 43, 280 463,,488 19,,326 526, 129
Column explanation:
(1) The program under which the officer was originally commissioned.
(2) Acquisition costs which are derived from Table VTI.
(3) Pre-commissioning costs which are derived from Table VTII.
(4) Post-commissioning costs which are based on the information
received from the questionnaire and officer personnel costs literature
supplemented by direct information from various offices within the Bureau
of Naval Personnel and Naval Education and Training Command.
(5) Separation, Leave and Travel costs are derived from Table X.
(6) Total costs. (AC + PRC + PC + SLT)
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Based on the assumption that the average commissioned life of
twice failed for selection for promotion of Regular Navy lieutenants
is 11.5 years, the total investment cost per officer, at this point
ranges from a high of $516,833 for a NROTC (Regular) with pilot
training to a low of $117,027 for an OCS without nuclear or pilot
training.
The average investment cost up to 11.5 years can be derived by
taking the average of the total costs presented on Table XI. Assuming
that the investment cost presented in the model, (Figure 1) remains
constant, it would mean that for each involuntary separation of a twice
failed select lieutenant, it will cost an average of $274,213 to
bring a new officer up to the same competency level.
E. RETENTION COST ANALYSIS
To this point only the average per capita cost required to
bring an officer to the 11.5 years mark have been considered.
This is the average sevice of a twice failed Navy lieutenant at
date of separation.
In order to evaluate whether separating the officer is cost
effective, it is necessary to recognize costs under different
alternatives. As a consequence of much research, the writer has
narrowed the field down to the following alternatives:
1. Retention through the normal promotion flow LT-LCDR-CDR.
2. Provide a 100% promotion for all Regular Navy lieutenants
eligible for promotion to lieutenant commander, under the assumption
that he will not be selected to commander.
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3. Offer Reserve appointments to twice failed select Navy
lieutenants for the purpose of continuing them on active duty as USNR
officers until completion of 20 years.
The cost model for each of the foregoing conditions are presented
on Figure 2. It should be noted that the model represents additive
costs beyond 11 . 5 years of average service
.
1. Retention through the Normal Promotion Flow LT-LCDR-CDR .
Under the assumption that the officer is a due course officer,
which means that he gets selected and promoted each time he is qualified,
it would mean that he will attained the grade of commander before
completion of 20 years service.
Although Title 10, U.S. Code guarantees the officer 26 years
commissioned service before he can be forced to retire, even though
he may failed selection for captain, 12 it is assumed that the officer
will retire upon completion of 20 years service. This assumption is
made in order to establish a common base under the various conditions
presented for cost comparison. The point that should be kept in
mind is the fact that a commander cannot be forced to retire on completion
of 20 years service without legislative action, i.e. a Hump Bill.
Thus, any extension of active duty beyond 20 years will result in
additional cost.
The average costs of an officer who gets promoted under the normal
promotion cycle and retires at 20 years of service are indicated on
Table XII.
To
United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces , United States Government
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(1) The average training cost is based on Fleet school courses
for senior officers such as the XO/PGO course. Most of these courses
are short durations and are normally taken enroute to the duty assigned.
(2) Average PCS cost is based on the average PCS (operational
move) cost of a commander with dependents multiplied by the average
number of anticipated moves.
(3) The pay and allowances is an estimated amount of pay
assuming the officer is a "due course" officer. This means that he
gets selected and promoted each time he becomes eligible for promotion.
The pay computation aoes not include special pay such as flight pay
and submarine pay.
(4) Total. (TRAINING COST + PCS COST + PAY AND ALLOWANCES)
2. Provide a 100% Promotion for all Regular Navy Lieutenants
Eligible for Promotion to Lieutenant Commander .
Title 10, United States Code provides the Secretary of the Navy
discretionary powers to establish promotion policies which could
include a 100% promotion opportunity for each pay grade below Flag
officer.-"
13
United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces, United States, Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1971, vol. 2, chapter 543, pp. 1722-1747
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If a 100% promotion opportunity is established, it will provide for
the selection of every qualified Regular Navy lieutenant for lieutenant
commander. Thus, the officer can be retained on active duty until
completion of 20 years assuming he is not selected for promotion to the
grade of commander or voluntarily resigned his commission.
The average costs for a lieutenant commander retained until
completion of 20 years service are indicated on Table XIII.
TABLE XIII
AVERAGE COST FOR A LCDR RETAINED ON ACTIVE
DUTY UNTIL COMPLETION OF 20 YEARS
TRAINING COST PCS COST PAY AND ALLOWANCES TOTAL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
$8,000 $178,615 $186,615
Column explanation:
(1) Training cost is assumed to be zero for a lieutenant commander.
(2) PCS cost is based on the average cost of travel (operational
move) of a lieutenant commander with dependents multiplied by the
average number of anticipated moves which is considered to be three
based on available sources.
(3) This is an estimated amount of pay that the officer would have
received if he is continued as a lieutenant commander until completion
of 20 years service. This amount does not include special pay such
as flight pay or submarine pay. It is also assumed that there is no
pay and allowances increase or decrease and that the officer is not
promoted to the grade of commander.




Because of the current promotion policy within the Navy which
allows the promotion opportunity to reduce as an officer advances in
grade, there will obviously be great differences in opinions that
can be expressed on such an alternative.
These great differences can be attributed to the following:
a. Personnel ceiling in the grade of lieutenant and
lieutenant commander.
b. What avenues are open for discharging the obviously
poor performers
.
With regard to personnel ceilings, the Secretary of the Navy
has the discretionary power to establish promotion eligibility and
thus establish personnel ceilings within each grade. This discretionary
power is delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code. Admittedly, a 100%
promotion to lieutenant commander could conceivably result in
overage in the lieutenant commander grade and shortage in the lieutenant
grade. Feasible solution, however, under the circumstances is to
impose more restraints on promotion on the first two rank structures
(Ensign to Lieutenant Junior Grade and Lieutenant Junior Grade to
Lieutenant) . Eliminate the poor performers at the early stage of
the officer's career which average approximately four years commissioned
service thus, reducing the number of officers eligible for promotion
to lieutenant commander at the 11.5 years of commissioned service.
With these constraints, elimination of the average 5 percent above
the zone and 15 percent below the zone selection opportunity it would
become feasible to provide 100 percent selection for all eligible
55

lieutenants without great distortion to the promotion structure.
Another area of concern is what happens to poor performers.
How can they be separated with a 100 percent promotion concept? Just
as in private enterprise, the Navy is no exception in overlooking
poor performers from the early stages of a person's career. Thus, a
lieutenant junior grade who for some reason was promoted to lieutenant
was later found to be a poor performer and cannot perform the duties
of his rank or higher obviously should not be promoted to lieutenant
commander. A 100 percent promotion policy, however, does not prevent
the Secretary of the Navy from separating such officers.
Section 6384 of Title 10, U.S. Code stipulates that a selection
board convened to select officers for promotion,
"Shall report from among those officers eligible for
consideration the name of each officer with less than
20 years of service whose record, in the opinion of the
board, indicates his unsatisfactory performance of
duty in his present grade, and, in the opinion of the
board indicates that he would not satisfactorily
perform the duties of a higher grade.
"
14
This provision of Title 10, U.S. Code further stipulates that
those officers whose names are reported under this section shall
be discharged on 30 June of the fiscal year in which their names are
so reported. Thus, if a lieutenant is a poor performer, he can still
be separated under statutory provision through the recommendation of
a selection board. This statutory provision is applicable for
14 United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces, United States, Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1971, vol. 2, pp. 1826-1827.
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all grades frcm Ensign to Captain.
3. Offer Reserve Appointments to TV/ice Failed Select Navy
Lieutenants for the Purpose of Continuing Them on Active Duty Until
Completion of 20 Years.
Under this alternative, those officers who failed of
selection for promotion to lieutenant commander should be offered
Reserve appointment and if accepted, they should be continued on active
duty until completion of 20 years or more, depending on the needs of
their services. This procedure can be accomplished in accordance with
15Title 10, United States Code, and the Officer Development and
1 c
Distribution Manual.
On completion of 8.5 years these officers can be retired or
involuntarily released to inactive duty if their services are no
longer required. The termination of service can be accomplished
involuntarily in accordance with existing statutory provisions and
17policies applicable to Reserve officers on active duty.
Approximate additive costs for this category of officer assuming
he is not promoted to lieutenant commander are indicated on Table XTV.
15 United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces, United States, Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1971, vol. 2, Chapter 35, p. 1285.
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Development and Distribution
Manual
,
Nov. 23, 1974, Chapter VII, Section 7104(h), p. VTI-4.
1
7
Chief of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, NAVPERS
15791B
, United States, Governirent Printing omce, wasnington, D.u.
,




AVERAGE COST OF A LIEUTENANT WHO IS RETAINED
UNTIL 20 YEARS OF SERVICE
TRAINING COST PCS COST PAY AND ALLOWANCES TOTAL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
$6,000 $167,393 $173,393
Column explanation:
(1) Training cost is assumed to be zero for a lieutenant who
failed selection for promotion.
(2) PCS cost is based on the average cost of travel (operational
move) of a lieutenant with dependents multiplied by the average
number of anticipated moves which is considered to be three based on
available sources.
(3) This is an estimated amount of pay that the officer would have
received if he is continuea on active duty as a lieutenant until
20 years service. This amount does not include special pay such
as flight pay or submarine pay. It is also assumed that there is no
pay and allowances increase or decrease and that the officer is not
promoted to the grade of lieutenant commander.
(4) Total cost. (TRAINING COST + PCS COST + PAY AND ALLOWANCES)
The major contention to this alternative is the fact that the
policies and regulations regarding twice failed select lieutenants
are deeply rooted and are difficult to change. Such policies and
regulations, however, were administratively established and can be
changed. For example, Chapter VII of the Officer Development and
Distribution Manual which amplifies Title 10, United States Code,
Section 6382 specifically states that Regular Navy lieutenants shall
be discharged not later than 30 June of the fiscal year they failed
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selection for promotion the second time except in the cases of those
lieutenants who are within two years of becoming eligible to retire.
Accordingly, those officers who failed of selection for promotion
twice, but are within two years of becoming eligible to retire with
pay are offered Reserve appointments. Those officers who accepted
are tendered the Reserve appointments for purpose of continuing
on active duty until completion of 20 years service or when retirement
eligibility is attained at which time they must request for voluntary
retirement. Those who do not request voluntary retirement are involuntarily
18
released to inactive duty pursuant to current policy.
Thus, compliance of the separation provision of Title 10, United
States Code and separation policies regarding twice failed select
Regular Navy lieutenants does not bar the Secretary of the Navy
from appointing such officers in the Naval Reserve and continuing them
on active duty as Reserve officers.
4. Costs of Retirement Benefits .
Since retirement benefits are also costs to the government
and the tax payers, these costs must also be considered.
The U.S. military retirement system, as presently designed,
functions to permit withdrawal of career personnel from the military
establishment at relatively young ages, in order to prevent the
organization from being dominated by those too old for the rigors
of military life and to insure that maintenance of "youth and vitality"
18
Chief of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, NAVPERS
15791B
,
United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
,
July 1969, Art. 3830110, pp. 38-13 through 38-16.
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will provide a combat effective organization. The removal of superannuated
personnel is a common objective of all retirement systems; however,
the military system is virtually unique with respect to the early age
at which the withdrawal of career members is mandatory or encouraged.
Consequently, every career military officer ultimately faces involuntary
retirement from military service.
Given the present assumptions concerning manpower requirements
(youth and vitality) and resultant methods of personnel management,
retirement of twice failed select officers is established at completion
of 20 years of active service, with average age of 43 - 50.
It is realized that in computing retirement benefits, time
period factors are uncertain since the specific age at which an
individual will die is unknown. However, expected value criteria
considers the uncertainty of future events to aid the individual
in decision making. This criteria weights the value of an outcome
with the probability that the outcome will occur. The probability
of death for any particular age or number of years can be computed from
observations contained in standard nortality tables and used to
weight the total value of retirement benefits. 1 ^ The standard mortality
table used in this analysis is presented on Table XV. The expectation
of life for any given age provides a mathematical average of the number
of years which one can expect to live.
1Q





COMMISSIONER'S 1958 STANDARD ORDINARY MORTALITY TABLE
TAKEN FROM THE LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, NEW YORK, INSURANCE
OF LIFE INSURANCE
LIFE
AGE EXPECTANCY (YEARS) AGE EXPECTANCY (YEARS)
30 41.25 51 22.82
31 40.34 52 22.03
32 39.43 53 21.25
33 38.51 54 20.47
34 37.60 55 19.71
35 36.69 56 18.97
36 35.78 57 18.23
37 34.88 58 17.51
38 33.97 59 16.81
39 33.07 60 16.12
40 32.18 61 15.44
41 31.29 62 14.78
42 30.41 63 14.14
43 29.54 64 13.51
44 28.67 65 12.90
45 27.81 66 12.31
46 26.95 67 11.73
47 26.11 68 11.17
48 25.27 69 10.64
49 24.45 70 10.12
50 23.63 71 9.63
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Thus, in this analysis, retirement benefits computation will be
weighed by the applicable life expectation to include the element
of uncertainty.
The total retirement benefits can be found by the formula:
TC = BP x R x LE
Where: TC = Total retirement cost based on retirement at
20 years active duty.
BP = Base pay at date of retirement.
R = Percentage rate applied in computing retirement
benefits
.
LE = Life expectancy based on average age.
Based on the foregoing formula, the approximate costs resulting from
retirement after completion of 20 years active service are indicated on
Table XVI.
The estimates presented on Table XVI are based on the following
assumptions
:
1. Basic pay used in the computation is based on current
pay table approved October 1, 1974.
2. Average age is 42. This average is assumed to be a realistic
average, since the average service entry age for officers who generally
canplete four years of college training before entry into service is
22 years.












AGE AT LIFE RETIREMENT CUMULATIVE
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(1) Rank at retirement.
(2) Average age at retirement.
(3) Life expectancy at age 42 based on 1958 Mortality Table taken
from the Life Insurance Fact Book, New York, Institute of Life
Insurance, 1972, pp. 108-109.
(4) Retirement annuity (50% of Basic Pay at date of retirement)
.
(5) Cumulative total based on life expectancy (Column 3 x column




The accumulated total cost that can be considered as additive costs
if the officer scheduled for involuntary separation is retained on




= AT + PCS + PA + RC
Where: TC^ = Total additive costs if the officer is retained on
active duty until completion of 20 years and then
retired.
PCS = Additional Permanent Change of Station costs.
PA = Pay and Allowances. This is based on current pay
rates and incremental increases as a result of
service longevity. However , it does not include
cost of fringe benefits such as, commissary,
exchange, etc.
PC = Cost of retirement derived from Table XVT.
Cost figures are indicated on Table XVTI.
F. COMPARISON OF COSTS
The two cost models introduced earlier should be viewed in terms
of cost streams to the government, thereby conceptualizing a gross
assumption of differences in costs viewed as a continuing stream of
outlays. The foregoing assumption is depicted in Figure 3. Figure
3 shows the stream of costs under the current policy and the three









































EH cm «. *














































































































Cost figures under the present policy and those of the proposed
alternatives are presented on Table XVIII. It should be noted that
the figures presented on Table XVIII are lower limit costs. Other
variable costs such as, commissary, exchange, pay increases, medical,
etc., are not included in the computation. Additionally, a discount
rate has not been applied.
Although the costs indicated on Table XVIII appear to show that
it cost more to retain an officer than it is to separate him, it should
be noted that the additive cost for 8.5 years is fixed cost. This
means that this cost will continue to be an outlay in the form of paying
another officer whether or not a lieutenant is separated or continued
and then retired.
Thus, the significant costs that must be assumed in this study
is whether it is cost effective to separate an officer after 11.5
years of service with a total average investment of $274,213, or
retain him knowing that after 20 years of service the officer
will retire with retirement benefits for life.
With this assumption Table XIX is presented for comparison.
A review of Table XIX show a difference of $21,658 between separating
a twice failed select Navy lieutenant and retaining him on active
duty. While the difference in cost do not appear to be of great
economic significant, it is worthy of consideration for further
cost effectiveness study in this area.
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AVERAGE COST TO SEPARATE VERSUS RETIREMENT COST
(EXCLUDING FIXED ADDITIVE COST FOR 8.5 YEARS)
SEPARATION COST RETIREMENT BENEFIT COST
(TCS = AC + PRC + PC + SLT) (TC = BP + R + LE)
$274,213 $252,555
Additionally, it should be noted that there is significant
difference between the costs of retaining a twice failed select
Navy lieutenant and a due course officer. For example, in the
case of a due course officer who retired at 20 years service, it will
cost the government and tax payers an average of $818,500 in the
form of investment. On the other hand retention of a twice failed
select lieutenant until 20 years will only cost an average of
$680,835.
Thus, retention of a twice failed select lieutenant could result
in cost savings in the average amount of $137,665.
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Having identified and chosen a sample of the population of twice failed
select Regular Navy lieutenants, and after an analysis of the policies,
regulations and the completed questionnaire regarding this category
of officers, the following conclusions are made:
1. Twice failed select lieutenants are separated in accordance
with Title 10, United States Code and Chapter VTI of the Officer
Development and Distribution Manual. There is no exception to this
policy except in the case of those twice failed select lieutenants who
are within two years of becoming eligible to retire with pay. Those
who are within two years of becoming eligible to retire are offered
Reserve appointments. If they accept the Reserve appointments, they
are retained until retirement eligibility is attained. Such
retention is solely for retirement purposes. There is no written policy
or any evidence that could be found by the writer to indicate that
twice failed Navy lieutenants who are not within two years of becoming
eligible to retire with pay are considered for retention prior to
their separation, except when the individual officer requests for
consideration. Available records revealed, however, that none of those
who requested consideration was continued.
2. In the area of officer promotion, the Officer Personnel Act
of 1947 provides the officer promotion machinery for each of the
armed services. Among other things, this act establishes categories
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of officers for promotion purposes, and from these categories,
zones of promotion are established. These "promotion zones,"
as they are called, are established by the service secretaries prior
to the convening of the appropriate promotion selection board. The
size of the promotion zone is a function of several factors. The
basic ones are:
(a) The number of vacancies expected to exist in the
next higher grade.
(b) A rough approximation of the desired promotion rate
(percentage of officers in the promotion zone to be selected)
.
(c) The time in grade for an officer in his present grade.
Promotion selection boards, however, are not tightly bound to the
approximate promotion rate envisioned by the service secretaries;
therefore, actual promotion rates can vary from year to year.
Additionally, each service secretary has the discretionary power to
authorize a 100% promotion in any grade other than Flag officers.
3. Results of the Survey revealed that:
(a) Most twice failed select Regular Navy lieutenants
are separated for reasons other than for cause and performance.
Of the 160 who responded to the questionnaire, 97.5 percent have indicated
that they have not received any unfavorable or unsatisfactory fitness
report during the period of their commission. The remaining 2.5 percent
wlio indicated having received an unsatisfactory or unfavorable report,
all have stated that the specific reports have little effect in their
non-selection for promotion to lieutenant commander.
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(b) They all indicated that the Navy is their career.
Additionally, most of the officers are married and responsible
family men. Of the 160 who responded to the questionnaire, 142 or 88.75
percent are married with dependents.
(c) They are as a group, highly educated and technically
trained. For example, the 160 who responded to the questionnaire,
100% have graduated from college, 17.5 percent have received the
Master of Science Degree from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, and although not tabulated, a substantial number of the
respondees have indicated that they have completed their postgraduate
education through off duty hours. Additionally, each officer has
gone through several technical courses offered by the various Navy
Fleet Schools.
(d) Responses to the questionnaire also revealed that
most of the officers possess a myriad of expertise and professional
knowledge which would definitely make them assets to the Navy.
This is particularly true in the case of those officer commissioned
through the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP)
and Naval Academy. A total of 69 or 43 percent of respondees were
commissioned through the NESEP and Naval Academy programs.
4. The cost analysis revealed that there is no great
economic difference whether a twice failed select Navy lieutenant
is separated or continued on active duty until completion of 20
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years service. Specifically, the difference is an average cost
of $21,658 per capita. However, in conparing the cost between
retaining a twice failed select Navy lieutenant and that of a
due course officer (an officer who gets selected and promoted every




VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The original purpose of this thesis as described earlier was
to determine whether it is more cost effective to separate twice
failed select Navy lieutenants than it is to continue them on
active duty.
In analyzing the data gathered with cost estimates, three
alternatives were presented. These were:
1. Retention of a due course officer. This is the officer
who gets selected and promoted each time he was eligible for promotion.
2. Provide a 100% promotion opportunity to every eligible
lieutenant who has performed satisfactorily.
3. Offer a Reserve appointment to every twice failed select
lieutenant for the purpose of continuing him on active duty.
During the course of gathering data, one area seems very clear
in that one of the mistakes often make by top management is the
fact that involuntary separation costs for twice failed select officers
are considered as if it had an end all its own, with a special
place in the national budget. Such is not the case. Every dollar
invested in an officer's acquisition, learning and separation
substracts that much from the resources available to the entire
Navy establishment that could be allocated for operational support.
Therefore, when viewing cost to the Government with respect
to involuntary separation, it appears that management should recognize
74

the technical character and more complex nature of our military
forces
.
First, adequate personnel strength and viability is necessary
in maintaining a ready and responsive posture to mission requirements
of the service. Without quantity and quality of people in both
the officer and enlisted corps to man its weapons and support
systems, the Navy would be sorely pressed to meet its role as a
deterrent to world aggression.
Second, training costs relative to the operation, maintenance,
and administration of today's sophisticated weapon systems
have been astronomical; and high turnover of personnel is a
significant factor in defense cost effectiveness. For example,
the average training costs of a pilot now exceeds a quarter of
a million dollars. It is certainly conceivable that it will not
be long before a pilot will have a one million dollar price tag
before he ever assume his first operational billet.
Admiral Bagley, former Chief of Naval Personnel puts it
very bluntly when he stated in the October 1974 Officer Personnel
Newsletter that:
"At no time in the history of the U.S. Navy has the
need been greater for highly competent, technically
trained unrestricted line officers. The requirements
both ashore and afloat for highly motivated URL officers
possessing this ' valuable commodity 1 continues to
grow at a rate far greater than our resources (money and
qualified candidates) are able to provide."
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Technological advancements, therefore, clearly indicate that a
greater need currently exists to maintain a high quality officer
community by improving management in the fields of career planning,
education, and utilization of officer abilities.
Most if not all, of the twice failed select officers have met
the foregoing criteria. This is supported by the following
facts obtained from the respondees to the questionnaire used for
this study:
1. 100% percent have indicated that the Navy is their career,
which is indicative of highly career motivated individuals.
2. 97.5 percent have indicated that they never receive any
unsatisfactory or unfavorable report and that non-selection for
promotion came as a great surprise. The 2.5 percent who have indicated
that they have received unsatisfactory or unfavorable fitness report
during the period they were commissioned also stated that the fitness report
in question have little effect in their failure of selection for
promotion. This points out the fact that most of the officers are
satisfactory performers, which means that non-selection can be
attributed to:
(a) Lack of career enhancing billets.
(b) Poor management in the officer career patterns.
(c) The officers were caught in a numbers game which




3. In spite of the circumstances that these officers
were in (essentially thrown out of the service after 11.5 years of
faithful and satisfactory service) , many were willing to continue
serving the Navy either as Reserve officers without further promotion
opportunities or as enlisted men. This is supported by the fact
that of the 160 who responded to the questionnaire, 76 percent were
willing to accept a Reserve appointment and continue serving
on active duty as lieutenants. Further, 23% were willing to enlist
and continue serving the Navy as enlisted men if a Reserve
appointment is not possible.
4. The fact that all of the officers have completed a four
year college education with a substantial number achieving graduate
level degrees is indicative that this group of officers are highly
educated. Additionally, responses to the questionnaire revealed
that most of these officers have varied experience and technical
expertise such as electronics, engineering, aviation maintenance,
nuclear weapons, etc.
In view of the foregoing, the writer feels that top management
should review the current policies and regulations that affects
twice failed select officers with the aim of optimizing the utilization
of these officer resources and at the same alleviating the junior
officer retention problems.
In the area of cost effectiveness, the writer concludes that
there is no great economic difference whether a twice failed select
lieutenant is continued or separated.
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However, the models presented in figures 1, 2 and 3 used in making
analytical determinations in this thesis indicate the kinds of
variables which need to be considered in developing a valid and
reliable measure of an investment in a twice failed select Navy lieutenant.
The models can help management to understand more fully the
nature of the problems and the importance of distinguishing between
an individual's realizable value to the Navy, a distinction often
overlooked in practice.
In considering the alternatives presented in this thesis,
several factors should be kept in mind:
First, the proposed alternatives are workable within the
current legal framework. Specifically the alternative
which provides for a 100% promotion opportunity or offer Reserve
appointments to twice failed select lieutenants are in support
of the Navy's current effort to retain officers with experience
and expertise.
Second, the alternatives presented could provide the much
needed incentive for junior officer retention in a draft free
environment. Such incentives could be in the form of an assured
career even for those who have had the misfortune to be assigned to
inferior billets in the early portion of their careers.
Another consideration that should be made is the morale
factors of an involuntary separation both from the viewpoint of
78

of the individual officer, his family and society. Although morale
factors are not measurable in dollar value, it could have significant
impact on the Navy's junior officer retention effort and the well
being of the family.
If the Navy feels that it has a moral obligation to retain
twice failed select lieutenants who are within two years of becoming
eligible to retire solely for that officer to attain retirement
eligibility, then it should have the moral obligation to continue
those officers who fail of selection for promotion through no fault




VII. SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER STUDY
A questionnaire form has been used to determine the type of
U.S. Navy lieutenant who failed selection for promotion. Further,
several cost analysis were made to determine investment costs that
could be appliea to this category of officers.
Although it should not be inferred that the analysis presented
purports to explain the nature of investment costs fully, or that
the variables are validated completely, the data obtained in the
study supports the validity of the hypothesized relationships.
However, only the average costs were included in the models.
Actual costs were eliminated because of time constraints for the
research and the difficulty of obtaining actual costs.
Thus, it is suggested that further research in this area include
actual costs. Also, the model should be expanded to include fringe
benefits cost such as commissary and exchange privileges which were




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Code 55cf (JTN)
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93940
Operations Research and Administrative
Sciences
Dear Lieutenant
The enclosed questionnaire is being forwarded to a selected sample
of USN officers who have been notified of their scheduled separation
from active service due to failure of selection for promotion for the
second time. The purpose of the questionnaire is to obtain relevant
statistical information in connection with an original research regarding
the involuntary separation of USN officers who failed selection for
promotion the second time.
The undersigned believes that problems exist in this area which
have not been thoroughly studied. The purpose of the study is to
determine alternative actions that could save the Navy the annual loss
of many outstanding officers.
The responses obtained in answer to this questionnaire will be
compiled and treated statistically for the purposes of this research.
Individual responses and comments will be held in the strictest
confidence by the undersigned and no individual reference which would
permit personal identification will be used in any report.
It is respectfully requested that you complete the enlcosed
questionnaire and return it in the enclosed self-addressed envelope at
your earliest convenience.
Your cooperation in answering all applicable questions frankly
according to your own feelings and in adding any comments desired will
be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,







PLEASE ANSWER EACH QUESTION AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE. EXPAND ON ANY
ANSWER OR ADD FURTHER INFORMATION YOU DESIRE IN THE SPACE PROVIDED AT
THE END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
1. What is your current officer status? Q USN \Z3 USNR
2. What is your current designator?
3. Do you have a previous designator?
Yes. Designator was
No.
4. When were you first conmission? (Please indicate in the blank
the month and year)
as USNR
as USN
5. Source of your coirmissioning?
I. I U.S. Naval Academy
NROTC (Regular)
I I NROTC (Contract)
1 I CCS
I"
"1 Direct from Enlisted status
l~~l Direct from Warrant status
I I NAVCAD Program
1 ( Augmentation Program
i I NESEP Program
I 1 Other (What?)
6. Please indicate below all the service schools attended and completed
while on active duty. (Examples are: nuclear power schools,
electronics school, carmunication officers school)
TYPE OF SCHOOL DURATION
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7. Did you take any undergraduate work at a college, university,
or Naval Postgraduate School/ Monterey sponsored by the Navy?
CD Yes.
ED no.
8. If the answer to 7 above is YES please complete the following.
Undergraduate work study taken at
(Name of college/university)
Curriculum
(Major or curriculum number)
Duration of the curriculum
Type of Degree received
9. Did you take any postgraduate work at a college/ university or
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey while in service?
1 I I did not take any postgraduate work while in the service.
1 I I took postgraduate work at
(college or university)
I ? I took postgraduate at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Course curriculum was
10. At the time you were notified of your pending separation because
of failure of selection for promotion you were :
! 1 Married
t I Widow
1 1 Divorced or Separated (wife or ex-wife dependent for some support)
I I Divorced or Separated (wife or ex-wife not dependent for support)
Not married
11. Number of dependent children at the time you were notified of your
pending separation? (Please indicate on the blank space the number)
Over 12 years of age
Under 12 years of age
12. Do you have other dependents besides wife and/or children?





13. Please indicate the total amount of active duty as of 30 June 1975
on the appropriate blank below:
Years of active duty as enlisted.
Years of active duty as officer.
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14. Total number of military moves (transfers) of which dependents
were not included (but travel expenses were required) . These
are transfer orders which require you to attend schools for
short duration or for certain duty assignments in which you
are not authorized to move dependents under government expenses.
Number of moves
15. Number of moves as a result of Permanent Change of Station orders
in which dependents were authorized move under government
expenses.
16. Please indicate on the following blank your current pay status:
Amount of base pay: $
BAS:
BAQ:
Special pay: (i.e. Submarine pay,
Flight pay, Diving pay, etc.
17. Did you ever receive any special compensation as a form of
incentive to remain on active duty? (i.e. nuclear submarine,
medical officer, etc?)
I
I Yes. Total amount received $
No.
18. Were you aware when you first failed selection for promotion?
CZ3 Yes.
lu no.
19. Do you feel that the reason for your non-selection for promotion




20. When you knew that you failed of selection for promotion the
first time, did you try to reach your detailer to discuss





21. During the time that you held a commission in the Navy or Naval




22. If your answer to question 21 above is YES, do you feel that
this fitness report (s) was (were) unjustified? (Please mark only
one answer)
.
1 1 Definitely unjustified.
1 I Somewhat justified.
| 1 Completely justified.
23. What effect did this (these) report (s) have in your failure of
selection for promotion?
I I Tremendous effect.
1 I Great effect.
1 | Little effect.
24. Prior to being notified of your pending separation, did you intend
to make the Navy a career?
Yes.
No.
25. If the Navy offers you an appointment in the Naval Reserve
after you are discharged for the purpose of continuing on
active duty, would you accept the appointment?
Yes.
No.
26. If you cannot be appointed in the Naval Reserve, but the
Chief of Naval Personnel offered you the opportunity to enlist
after discharge in order to serve on active duty in an enlisted





27. If your answer to 26 above is YES what would be the highest
enlisted grade you will be willing to enlist in?
I I E-3 E-7
I I E-4 E-8
I I E-5 E-9
E-6
28. Please indicate below the number of days of leave that you
will have accumulated at date of separation.
Number of days




30. What is your present duty station?
31. Which of the following do you intend to select for the purpose
of moving your household after separation?
I I Home of Record.
I I
Home of Selection.
32. Which of the following is considered the farther away from
your current duty station for purpose of travel and movement
of household goods?
| I Home of Record.
I I Home of Selection.
33. If you have any comments or recommendations regarding the
Navy's policy and/or management of twice fail select officers,
please write it below as fully as you like. Additional pages





TWICE FAILED SELECT NAVY LIEUTENANTS
RELEVANT CQMMENTS/REOOyiMENDATIONS NUMBER MAKING RESPONSE
Fitness Report System 6
The Bureau of Naval Personnel should notify 1
the officer when he failed
selection and advise him of short
comings and provide training or
counseling to improve his chances for
promotion the next time he is considered
Comments on lack of planning moves or 5
early rotation particularly for
those overseas with families
Twice failed select officers who must 1
be involuntarily separated should
have some form of retirement pension
similar to that offered civilian
employees under the pension Reform
Act of 1974
Comments relating to establishment of some 14
form of a continuation board to further
review the involuntary release of
twice failed select officers to determine
future potential and service to the Navy.
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RELEVANT CCMMENTS/REOOr^IEISiriATIONS NUMBER MAKING RESPONSE
Comments relevant to the waste of time 4
and cost to the Navy to select and send
to postgraduate school for those
officers who do not appear likely
to be promoted.
Job placement or seme form of 4
assistance should be provided to assist
twice failed select officers who must
be involuntarily separated because of
failure of selection for promotion.
Twice failed select officers should be 1
automatically offered USNR commission
in order to remain on the Naval Reserve
as a cost saving to the Navy.
Detailing policy by the Chief of Naval 15
Personnel is very poor with respect to
accommodating the individual officer
assignments that fall within a favorable
career pattern.
Comments relevant to inability by the 24
Chief of Naval Personnel to provide
some information regarding reason for
failure of selection and to provide some
form of guidance or reassignnent of duties
to enhance promotion opportunities.
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RELEVANT (XMyiENTS/RECOMMEMJATIONS NUMBER MAKING RESPONSE
The current policy for the involuntary 3
separation of USN lieutenants
who failed selection twice is
basically a good policy.
Comments relevant to the deficiency of 2
severance pay and a maximum 60 days
accrued leave that can be paid
Comments relevant to providing 100% 1
promotion opportunity for LCDR which is
at tiie average of 11 years service and provide
for forced attrition at an earlier period
thus providing better opportunity for
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